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Abstract
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathemat-
ics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian con-
ception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes,
qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the ob-
ject as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which
these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a
physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only
if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–
extrinsic distinction is flawed.
Introduction
1. There is a long-standing debate in contemporary metaphysics about the
precise definition of intrinsic property. The great majority of the suggested defi-
nitions are some enhanced version of Jaegwon Kim’s (1982) definition, express-
ing the following simple idea:
Intrinsic properties are the properties a particular object would
have even if no other contingently existing objects existed in the
world. (Allen 2018)
Although Kim’s definition has been widely accepted as basically adequate cri-
terion of intrinsicality, it has been challenged by subtle examples and amended
at several points. Beyond these improvements, the intrinsic–extrinsic dis-
tinction is often discussed in a wider context of other closely related meta-
physical problems, such as categorical–dispositional, pure–impure, relational–
non-relational, interior–exterior distinctions; the problem of identity, dupli-
cate, persistence; or the problem of Cambridge change. (E.g. Lewis 1983;
Sider 1996; Humberstone 1996; Vallentyne 1997; Langton and Lewis 1998;
Francescotti 1999; Lewis 2001; Marshall 2016; Marshall and Weatherson 2018).
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It is not my intention, however, to review these debates, as the aim of this paper
is to challenge the concept of intrinsicality from a completely different point of
view and to show that the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed on a more
fundamental level.
2. Accordingly, my analysis will be restricted in two significant senses:
(a) The discussion will be restricted to the case of ordinary physical proper-
ties of physical objects.
(b) The whole analysis will remain within a radical physicalist ontological
doctrine: The world can be completely accounted for by assuming that
only physical entities exist.
Constitutive a priori
3. An object can possess a property X only if the term X has meaning. This
might sound too radical. Probably, a less radical statement would be easily ac-
cepted: The knowledge claim that an object possesses a property X is possible
only if the term X has meaning. But, just here is the philosophically relevant
point: this is not simply a matter of semantics. As Reichenbach pointed out in
his Relativity Theory and A Priori Knowledge (1920), the coordinative definitions,
that is, the semantic conventions by which physical quantities or conceptions
are defined in empirical terms, play constitutive role; they are constitutive a pri-
ori. “They define the individual elements of reality and in this sense constitute
the real object.” (p. 53)
Reichenbach sharply distinguishes two different aspects of Kantian a priori:
Kant’s concept of a priori has two different meanings. First, it
means “necessarily true” or “true for all times,” and secondly, “con-
stituting the concept of object.”
The second meaning must be clarified. According to Kant, the
object of knowledge, the thing of appearance, is not immediately
given. Perceptions do not give the object, only the material of which
it is constructed. Such constructions are achieved by an act of judg-
ment. The judgment is the synthesis constructing the object from
the manifold of the perception. For this purpose it orders the per-
ceptions according to a certain schema; depending on the choice of
the schema, either an object or a certain type of relation will result.
Intuition is the form in which perceptions present the material—
thus performing another synthesis. But the conceptual schema, the
category, creates the object; the object of science is therefore not a
“thing-in-itself” but a reference structure based on intuition and
constituted by categories. (pp. 48–49)
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4. Let me give an example. Electrodynamics begins with the operational
definitions of the basic electrodynamic quantities. For example, electric field
strength is defined as the force felt by the unit test charge in electromagnetic
field, when the test charge is at rest.1 This operational definition, therefore
the notion of physical quantity called electric field strength is a priori in the
sense that it is prior to our empirical knowledge about the electromagnetic
field. There are no empirical facts which would determine the convention by
which this physical quantity is defined. In other words, the electromagnetic
field, as a “thing-in-itself” does not determine that such a physical quantity is
necessarily introduced for its characterization, as one of its fundamental fea-
ture. (In fact, the so called “displacement vector”, a different physical quantity
having a completely different operational definition, is an equally good alter-
native for the description of electromagnetic field.)
Once electric field strength is introduced, we can observe empirical facts
about it. We can measure, for example, the electric field strength around a
point charge being at rest, and, by inductive generalization, we can ascertain
the Coulomb Law: E = kQ
r2
. To be sure, the law of physics we ascertained is a
posteriori; it can be known only from empirical observations. But the features of
the physical reality that the physical law talks about is a priori constructed by us.
5. All this means that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) at-
tributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”;
they require the existence of something else, an epistemic agent constituting
them. This recognition outlines an argument against intrinsic–extrinsic dis-
tinction.
6. However, the Kantian–Reichenbachian account raises several problems.
It is not clear at all what kind of ontological entity is involved by the required
epistemic agency. Is it a contingently existing flesh and blood physical being?
Or is it an abstract entity, as sometimes the Kantian “transcendental subject” is
interpreted? (Carr 1999, p. 53) To what extend is a semantic convention free?
Are there “coordinating principles”, “prescriptions for the conceptual side of
the coordination”, as Reichenbach (1920, p. 54) presupposes? And what is the
origin of such principles? Logic and mathematics? Are logical and mathemati-
cal truths necessary truths? If so, how to avoid then necessarily true synthetic a
priori statements about the physical world? Finally, how to incorporate seman-
tic and epistemological holism, the fact that “our statements about the external
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a cor-
porate body” (Quine 1951)?
In the next sections, I will attempt to formulate the argument outlined in
point 5, in such a way that the above mentioned problems will be resolved or
avoided. To achieve this aim, however, I need to redraw a larger picture.
1For the sake of simplicity I use this naive definition. For more precise operational definitions
of electrodynamic quantities, see Gömöri and Szabó 2013.
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Physico-formalist account of logic and mathematics
7. I begin with a physicalist account of logic and mathematics. How can
the logical and mathematical facts be accommodated in a purely physical on-
tology? Physicalism denies the existence of mental and abstract entities; con-
sequently, there is no room left for any kind of platonism or mentalism in the
philosophy of logic and mathematics. Therefore, two possibilities are left: a
Millian-style physical realist approach, and formalism. We can disregard from
the Millian realism, in which mathematics itself becomes a physical theory,
in the sense of physical theory as described in the next section. So, formal-
ism – more precisely, what I will call physco-formalism – seems to be the only
account for logic and mathematics that can be compatible with physicalism.
Therefore, the formalist approach is our starting point.
First we need to clarify: What are the logical/mathematical facts? The for-
malist thesis can be summarized in one famous sentence of Hilbert: “Math-
ematics is a game played according to certain simple rules with meaningless
marks.” (Bell 1951, 38) Accordingly, in the formalist account, a mathematical
statement/fact/truth is like “Σ ` A”. According to the formalist view, neither
A nor the elements of Σ are statements, which could be true or false. They are
just meaningless strings, formulas of the formal system in question. The en-
tailment ` relation has nothing to do with “truth preserving if-then-type rea-
soning”; it simply stands for the fact that there is a finite sequence of meaning-
less strings of symbols, fitting into some structural patterns called “derivation
rules”. As a visual illustration, Fig. 1 shows a short example: the first order
axiomatic formulation of group theory and the proof that p(e,p(e, e)) = e is a
theorem. As this simple illustration shows, such an “evident truth” that “the
unit element three times multiplied by itself equals the unit element” precisely
means the existence of a sequence of formulas, (1)–(9) in Fig. 1, constituting a
proof.
8. How can a formal system be accommodated in a purely physical ontol-
ogy? Where are the states of affairs located in the physical world that make
propositions like “Σ ` A” true or false? For example, what are the facts
of the physical world that make the sequence of formulas (1)–(9) a proof of
p(e,p(e, e)) = e in Fig 1? Consider the first formula (1) in the proof. From
ontological point of view, what does it mean that it is nothing else but axiom
(G2)? It means that the formula p(e, x) = x in row (1) is the same as the formula
p(e, x) = x in row (G2). More exactly: it means the physical fact that the arrange-
ment of black and white pixels on the screen of my laptop on which I am writ-
ing this paper – or the arrangement of ink particles on the printout – in row (1)
and the corresponding arrangement of black and white pixels in row (G2) are
similar (congruent). Similarly, what does it mean that formula ∀xp(e, x) = x
in (2) is obtained from p(e, x) = x by the derivation rule (G)? It means that re-
placing the pixel-configuration φ in φ ` ∀xφ , with copy/paste, by p(e, x) = x
in (1), the resulted pixel-configuration is p(e, x) = x ` ∀xp(e, x) = x, such that
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Alphabet
variables x,y,z, . . .
individual constants e (identity)
function symbols i,p (inverse, product)
predicate symbol =
logical symbols ∀,¬→
OTHERS (, ), ,
Derivation rules
(MP) {φ, (φ→ ψ)} ` ψ (modus ponens)
(G) φ ` ∀xφ (generalization)
Axioms
(PC1) φ→ (ψ→ φ)
(PC2) (φ→ (ψ→ χ))→ (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ)
(PC3) (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ→ φ)
(PC4) ∀x (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ) (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC5) ∀xφ→ φ (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC6) ∀xφ(x)→ φ(t) (if t is a term which is free for x in φ(x))
(E1) x = x
(E2) t = s→ fn (u1,u2, . . . , t, . . .un) = fn (u1,u2, . . . ,s, . . .un)
(E3) t = s→ (φ (u1,u2, . . . , t, . . .un)→ φ (u1,u2, . . . ,s, . . .un))
(G1) p(p(x,y),z) = p(x,p(y,z))
(G2) p(e,x) = x
(G3) p(i(x),x) = e
Theorem: p(e,p(e,e)) = e
Proof:
(1) p(e,x) = x (G2)
(2) ∀xp(e,x) = x (G)
(3) ∀xp(e,x) = x→ p(e,e) = e (PC6)
(4) p(e,e) = e (2), (3), (MP)
(5) ∀xp(e,x) = x→ p(e,p(e,e)) = p(e,e) (PC6)
(6) p(e,p(e,e)) = p(e,e) (2), (5), (MP)
(7) p(e,e) = e→ p(e,p(e,e)) = p(e,e)→ p(e,p(e,e)) = e (E3)
(8) p(e,p(e,e)) = p(e,e)→ p(e,p(e,e)) = e (4), (7), (MP)
(9) p(e,p(e,e)) = e (6), (8), (MP)
Figure 1: Group theory and one of its theorems
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Figure 2: In order to isolate the common essential features of different physi-
cally existing formal systems L1,L2,,L3, . . .Ln we must have a “meta-theory” of
L1,L2,,L3, . . .Ln, using another physically existing formal systemM.
the left hand side is similar to the pixel-configuration p(e, x) = x in (1) and the
right hand side is similar to ∀xp(e, x) = x in (2). And so on and so forth.
Of course, a formal system can be thought of in different physical forms;
written with ink on paper, in the form of brain states and brain processes, in
the form of electronic states and electronic processes in a computer, etc. What
is important is the following observation:
The physico-formalist thesis The logical and mathematical facts, since
being formal facts, are nothing but physical facts of physically existing
formal systems consisting of signs and derivation patterns embodied in
concrete physical objects, concrete physical configurations, and concrete
physical processes. (Szabó 2003; 2012; 2017).
The physico-formalist account remains completely within the physicalist ontol-
ogy: there is no need for hypostatized entities – abstract, conceptual, or mental
formal systems – which exist over and above the physically existing formal sys-
tems embodied in concrete physical objects, concrete physical configurations,
and concrete physical processes.
9. “Abstract” or “mathematical” formal system is often conceived as an en-
tity obtained by abstraction, by isolating the common features in a number of
particular physically existing formal systems (e.g. Curry 1951, 30). To maintain
the physico-formalist thesis, it is worthwhile to illustrate that such an abstrac-
tion does not lead out of the realm of the physically existing formal systems.
Consider a number of different physically existing formal systems
L1,L2, . . .Ln, embodied in different particular physical systems (Fig. 2). To ab-
stract from some peculiar properties of physical objects L1,L2, . . .Ln, and to
isolate the common essential features of them, first of all requires knowledge
of the properties of the physical objects in question. That is, we must have a
physical theory (M,S) – in the sense of the definition of physical theory in the
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next section – describing L1,L2,,L3, . . .Ln, using another physically existing for-
mal system M. Abstraction is a relationship, formulated in (M,S), between
two, a more detailed and a less detailed, representations of L1,L2,,L3, . . .Ln.
Only in a suitable formal system M it is meaningful to talk about similarity
or isomorphism between the structures describing L1,L2, . . .Ln, and, for exam-
ple, about the equivalence class of these structures, which could be regarded
as the product of the abstraction process. But, all these are contained in M, a
formal system existing in the physical world. Thus, abstraction does not lead
out of the physical realm. It does not produce “abstract formal systems” over
and above the physically existing ones. One physically embodied formal sys-
tem can be applied in the description of another physically embodied formal
system, that’s all.
10. Thus, any statement about a formal system – including a statement like
“Σ ` A” – is a statement of a physical fact; consequently, it has exactly the same
epistemological status as any other statements about the physical world. This
has far-reaching consequences, of course: Logical and mathematical truths ex-
press objective (mind independent) facts of a particular part of the physical
world, namely, the facts of the formal systems themselves. As such, they are
synthetic, a posteriori, not necessary, and not certain; they are fallible. But they
have contingent factual content, as any similar scientific assertion, so they “can
be true and useful and surprising” (Ayer 1952, 72). The logical and mathemat-
ical facts can be discovered, like any other facts of nature, just like a fact about
a plastic molecule, or other artifact.
The fact that the formal systems usually are simple physical systems of rel-
atively stable behavior, like a clockwork, and that the knowledge of logical
and mathematical truths does not require observations of the physical world
external to the formal systems explains the universal illusion that logical and
mathematical truths are necessary, certain and a priori.
Physical theory
11. Following Carnap, a physical theory, providing a description of a cer-
tain part of physical reality, U, can be considered as a partially interpreted
formal system, (L,S). The formal system L is given by the language and the
derivation patterns, and the axioms. Traditionally, the axioms are divided into
the logical axioms (ideally, the first-order predicate calculus with identity), the
axioms of some mathematical theories, and, of course, some physical axioms.
How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology?
The L-part is already solved by the physico-formalist interpretation of formal
system and logical/mathematical fact. But, how can the physicalist account
for meaning and truth? Again, first we need to clarify what it is that has to be
accounted for; we need a definition of semantic relationship between formulas
of a formal system and states of affairs in the physical world.
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12. The definition will be based on the intuition we can learn from Gödel’s
construction of representation of the meta-arithmetic facts in Peano arithmetic,
in the preparation of the first incompleteness theorem (e.g. Crossley et al. 1990,
62). In his construction, Gödel clearly defines, when we are entitled to say
that a formula of a formal system (in his case, a formula of Peano arithmetic)
represents/means/refers to a fact of the world outside of the formal system (in
his case, a meta-arithmetic fact). Mutatis mutandis, we will repeat the same
definition.
One is entitled to say that a formula A represents or means a state of affairs
a in U, if the following two conditions are met:
(A) There exist a family {Aλ}λ of formulas in L and a family {aλ}λ of
states of affairs in U, such that A = Aλ0 and a = aλ0 for some λ0.
(B) For all λ,
if aλ is the case in U then Σ ` Aλ
if aλ is not the case in U then Σ ` ¬Aλ
13. A few important remarks are in order.
(a) As we have seen, to be a meaning-carrier is not simply a matter of
convention or definition or declaration. Semantics is not an arbitrary
assignment of states of affairs of the world to linguistic elements of
the theory.
(b) It is pointless to talk about the meaning of an isolated formula of the
theory. (Semantic holism) It is not only because of condition (A), but
also because in condition (B) a big part of the axiomatic system can
be involved.
(c) It must be recognized that condition (B) is exactly the same as the
necessary and sufficient condition for the theory (L,S) to be true.
That is, the two conceptions meaning and truth are completely inter-
twined.
(d) The semantics, in the above holistic sense, is a part and parcel of
physical theory. In case of empirical failure of a physical theory,
semantics is one of the possible object of revision. In other words,
semantics is as much hypothetical as any other part of the theory.
14. It must be clear that aλ – as a symbol in the meta-language we use to de-
scribe the semantic relationship – stands for a state of affairs, a configuration of
the physical world. Also, according to the physico-formalist approach “Σ ` Aλ”
and “Σ ` ¬Aλ”, respectively, are states of affairs in the physical world, facts of
the physically embodied formal system L. Thus, what we observe in condition
(B) is a kind of regularity or correlation between physical facts of two parts of the
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physical world, L and U. Combining this with the thesis of the principle of com-
mon cause2, one must conclude that both semantic relationship and the truth
of the physical theory (consequently, our knowledge) must be brought about by
the underlying causal processes of the physical world, going on in the common
causal past of the two parts of the world L and U. This underlying process is
what we normally call learning through experience. That is, no genuine knowledge
of the physical world is possible without experience. By the same token, no seman-
tically meaningful talk about the physical world is possible without experience. There
is no a priori meaning and there is no a priori truth.
15. Let us clarify then the role of logic and mathematics in our knowledge
of the physical world. One might ask: if mathematics is only about the formal
systems without meaning, how is it, then, possible that mathematical struc-
tures prove themselves to be so expressive in the physical applications? As
Richard Feynman put it: “I find it quite amazing that it is possible to predict
what will happen by mathematics, which is simply following rules which re-
ally have nothing to do with the original thing.” (Feynman 1967, 171)
We need to separate the sociological/practical aspect of this issue from the
epistemological one. Let me start with the sociological aspect. From sociologi-
cal point of view, by “mathematics” we mean that part of the axioms of L (see
point 11) which is traditionally considered as non-physical axioms. It must be
clear however that it is not “mathematics” alone by which the physicist can pre-
dict what will happen, but the physical axioms together with the logical and
mathematical axioms. The physicist, keeping, as long as possible, the logical
and mathematical axioms fixed – for good sociological/practical reason –, tunes
the physical axioms such that the theorems derivable from the unified system of
logical, mathematical, and physical axioms (together with the deduction rules)
+ the semantics, as a whole, be compatible with the empirical facts. Conse-
quently, the employed logical and mathematical structures in themselves need
not, and do not, reflect anything about the real world in order to be useful.
Let me recall an analogy I gave in my (2017). You can experience a analo-
gous situation when you change the mouse driver on your computer (or just
change the mouse settings): first you feel that the pointer movements (“de-
rived theorems”) generated by the new driver (“mathematics”) according to
your previously habituated hand movements (“physical axioms”) do not faith-
fully reflect the arrangement of your screen content (experienced world). Then,
keeping the driver (and driver settings) fixed, you tune your hand movements
– through typical “trial and error” learning – such that the generated pointer
movements fit to the arrangement of your screen content.
Thus, there is no miraculous “preadaption” or “pre-established harmony”
involved just because certain aspects of empirical reality “fit themselves into
the forms provided by mathematics”. This is simply a result of the physicist’s
2I mean the Reichenbachian thesis that no correlation without causation; every correlation is
either due to a direct causal effect, or is brought about by a third factor, a so-called common cause
(e.g. Reichenbach 1956; Hofer-Szabó et al. 2013).
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continuous choice from the store shelves of mathematics, and the continuous
tuning the physical axioms.
From epistemological point of view the situation is even more simple. In a
physical theory (L,S), the formal system L is a single undivided whole. As a
formal system, L can be the object of logical/mathematical investigation and
knowledge. In itself, however, it has nothing to do with the physical world de-
scribed by the physical theory (L,S). In case of empirical failure of the physical
theory (L,S), any element of L as well as the semantics can be the object of revi-
sion. Through this continuous “trial and error” process, the physicist tunes the
physical theory (L,S), as a whole, be compatible with the experienced world;
satisfy condition (B) in point 12.
Constitutive a priori reconsidered
16. Consider the following example. Given that L is consistent, one can
easily see that the following statements cannot hold true at the same time:
(i) A refers to a
(ii) L ` A
(iii) a is not the case in U
since (i) and (iii), according to condition (B) in point 12, would imply L ` ¬A,
in contradiction with (ii). Therefore, observing that a is not the case we are not
entitled to say that we observe that “¬A”. Simply because if a is not the case,
then condition (B) fails, and the whole semantics is lost. Therefore ¬A does
not carry meaning at all. That is to say, we are not able to attribute a feature,
whatsoever, to the physical reality in the situation when a is not the case.
17. Let us denote this unexpressed, unarticulated state of affairs by a∗.
Once a modified (or completely new) theory, (L ′,S ′), is constructed with a new
family of state of affairs
{
a ′λ ′
}
λ ′ and a new family of formulas
{
A ′λ ′
}
λ ′ , such
that a∗ = a ′λ ′∗ and condition (B) in point 12 is satisfied, the corresponding A
′
λ ′∗
will be attributed to a∗, as true feature of reality in state a∗.
18. This example not only confirms what was said in point 13 (d), but also
sheds light on the constitutive role of semantics, similar to the constitutive role
of Reichenbach’s coordinative definitions we described in point 3. There are
however significant differences:
(a) The whole account I developed remains within the clear and mini-
mal ontological framework of physicalism.
(b) All entities involved are contingently existing physical objects.
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(c) Whatever is the concrete physical process (point 14) producing the
correlation required in condition (B) of point 12, that is, producing
meaning and truth, it is a contingently existing part of the physical
reality.
(d) Therefore, the whole “epistemic agency” involved is embodied in
the physical world.
(e) The formal system in (L,S) plays, indeed, a similar role as Reichen-
bach’s “constitutive principle”; except that
– L has a clear ontological status; it is a part of the physical world,
– and all facts of L are contingent facts of the physical world,
therefore they do not generate necessarily true synthetic a priori
statements about the physical world, for sure.
(f) There is no “conceptual side of the coordination”. The constitu-
tive role of formal systems by no means entitles us to say that there
is a hypostatized a priori conceptual scheme in terms of which we
grasp the experienced reality, and that this conceptual scheme gen-
erates analytic truths. For, what there is is anything but conceptual:
we only have the physically existing formal systems which have no
meaning. Once an otherwise meaningless formula of a formal sys-
tem is provided with meaning, in the sense of point 12, it becomes
true or false in a non-analytic sense.
(g) Certainly, semantics plays constitutive role; not in the form of iso-
lated operational definitions of physical concepts, but in holistic
sense. Moreover, semantics is completely intertwined with the truth
of the theory; also, not in the form of the truth of isolated predictions,
but in holistic sense of (B) in point 12.
(h) In fact, therefore, what plays the constitutive role is the whole the-
ory (L,S), though, the whole theory is certainly not a priori. As we
have seen, however, aprioricity is not required for playing a consti-
tutive role. That is why there is no tension, whatsoever, between
the fact that the applied logical and mathematical structures as well
as the constructed semantics can change (see point 17) when a the-
ory is superseded by another one, on the one hand, and their con-
stitutive role in furnishing reality, on the other (cf. Friedman 2001;
MacArthur 2008; Ivanova 2011).
(i) Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the constitutive role of the
theory (L,S) in furnishing “the »continuum« of reality” (Reichen-
bach 1920, p. 50) with objects, properties, and relations, in itself, by
no means implies the denial of realism; the belief that the existence
of the objects, properties, and relations posited by the theory is a
real feature of reality. What is true about scientific realism is also
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true about metaphysical realism – if the distinction is meaningful at
all. For a “metaphysical” account must have the structure of (L,S)
in order to be meaningful and true, just in the sense we described in
point 12.
19. Thus, the corrected formulation of the argument against intrinsic–
extrinsic distinction, outlined in point 5, is the following. The features (at-
tributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by
the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require the existence of something else: a
physical theory (L,S) by means of which these features are constituted. The
existence of (L,S) however implies the existence of a physically embodied for-
mal system L and a real causal process in the physical world producing the
correlation required for both the semantics and the truth of the theory. All this
means that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently
existing physical objects exist.
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